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This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1998-1999 European Forum 
programme on Recasting the European Welfare State: Options, Constraints, Actors, 
directed by Professors Maurizio Ferrera (Universities of Pavia and Bocconi, Milano) and 
Martin Rhodes (Robert Schuman Centre).
Adopting a broad, long-term and comparative perspective, the Forum will aim to:
■ scrutinize the complex web of social, economic and political challenges to contemporary 
European welfare states;
• identify the various options for, and constraints on institutional reform;
discuss the role of the various actors in promoting or hindering this reform at the national, 
sub-national and supra-national level;
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Until recently, long-term care represented a fragmented and often neglected 
social policy issue in many European countries. Forecasts regarding the demand 
for long-term care in the coming three decades, changes in traditional support 
systems and in the attitudes towards informal care-giving and the perception of 
what is seen as public responsibility in care, as well as incentives from the 
social, political and economic environment increased awareness for long-term 
care and made it a major social policy issue. Parallel to the novelty on the top- 
agenda of social policy, long-term care is one of the less researched areas in 
social policy, which is even more true for cross-country comparative research. 
Only in the 1990s is there an increase in comparative research on long-term 
care. The OECD has produced a series of publications on the topic (e.g. OECD 
1996; 1994) and the issue was addressed by the EU in the European Observatory 
on Ageing (e.g. Walker, Guillemard and Alber 1993). A number of comparative 
studies have looked at home care and social services (Weekers and Pijl 1998; 
Hutten and Kerkstra 1996; Jamieson and Illsley 1990), payment for care 
programmes (Weekers and Pijl 1998; Evers, Pijl and Ungerson 1994; 
Glendinning and McLaughlin 1993), family care (Jani Le-Bris 1993), gender 
issues in care (Knijn and Kremer 1997; Ungerson 1995), or a variety of specific 
economic questions (contributions in Eisen and Sloan 1996).
The objective of this paper is to analyse how different countries approach 
the objective of equity in the provision of long-term care. Explicitly or 
implicitly, welfare state definitions and social policy definitions include notions 
such as equity, justice or equality, they are even at the core of these definitions. 
Equity is widely accepted as an objective in social policy. And equity is an 
attractive label in social policy making. However, apart from a basic agreement 
on equity as an objective of the welfare state, we are far from reaching an 
agreement on what constitutes equity. Precise specifications of equity are rare, 
in policy-making as well as in research. This paper attempts to analyse the 
equity approaches and the operationalisation of equity in long-term care systems 
in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Whereas most equity 
studies in social policy attempt either to search for the interpretation of equity, 
or to analyse one specific interpretation of equity, the objective of this paper is 
to search for and to analyse the range of equity interpretations in long-term care 
policies with regard to the provision of care.
’ This text is a revised version of a paper presented at the European Forum Conference on "Beyond the Health 
Care State: Institutional Innovations and New Priorities in Access, Coverage and Provision of Health Services”. 
26-27 February 1999, at the European University Institute. The conference was organised by Maurizio Ferrera 
(University of Pavia), Ana Guillen (University of Oviedo) and August Oesterle (Vienna University of 



























































































First of all, the paper presents a basic definition of long-term care and 
looks at the institutional and policy mix in long-term care reflecting the options 
to organise the provision of long-term care. Then, equity as an objective of the 
welfare state as well as the elements to achieve this objective will be introduced. 
These conceptualisations will then be used in the empirical analysis of the long­
term care systems in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
The focus of the paper is on the design of the allocation of resources (provision) 
through public policies and the implications for care-receivers.
BASIC DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
Long-term care
The OECD defines long-term care as “Any form of care provided consistently 
over an extended period of time, with no predetermined finishing date, to a 
person with a long-standing limiting condition or who is at risk of neglect or 
injury.” (Kalisch, Aman and Buchele 1998) Long-term care contains at least 
four kinds of help or support: skilled medical and nursing care, personal care, 
domestic support, and social support. Whereas medical and nursing care can 
only be provided by specially skilled providers, the other support patterns cover 
needs of daily living, usually undertaken by the individual or organised within 
the family and other social networks. Broadly speaking, long-term care covers 
care needs of frail elderly as well as disabled people.
Concepts defining the target group of long-term care focus on the 
assessment of impairments, the inability to or the limitations in fulfilling certain 
activities, or the amount of help needed. All these approaches produce 
considerable variations in the actual target group depending on which activities 
of daily living are included in the respective indexes, which spaces of help are 
recognised, how answer categories are designed, how measurement procedures 
are organised or who is involved in the measurement procedure. (Edvartsen 
1996)
The various options regarding actors and policies in long-term care 
systems are shown in figure 1. The provision of long-term care is characterised 
by an institutional mix including the informal sector, the voluntary (nonprofit) 
sector, the market sector, and the public sector. In general the bulk of care­
giving is still done in the informal sector. Regarding the formal sector there are 
considerable differences in terms of the degree of service provision as well as in 
terms of the division of responsibilities between the public and the private 
nonprofit sector, which are the main providers in the formal sector. The role of 




























































































the public role is very limited. Policy approaches include in kind as well as cash 
provision. Recently, there is a notable shift from residential care settings to care 
in the community. By introducing cash benefits a number of countries shift 
decision-making power over the care arrangement to the informal sector.
Table 1: The provision of long-term care
Provision
Providers in cash in k ind
Families
Other informal networks














Recent policy directions in long-term care can be summarised as policies "... to 
contain the heavy growth of health expenditure, to define policy priorities for 
the rapidly growing group of elderly persons, to provide adequate coverage for 
the growing need of long-term care, to reorganise residential care, and to 
introduce new incentives for the development of community care and informal 
care." (Walker, Guillemard and Alber 1993: 62) As far as the equity objective is 
concerned, policy statements in long-term care are rather vague although 
objectives such as ‘provision of an adequate coverage’ or ‘redistribution 
between public and private responsibility’ point at the importance of the issue.
Equity
Searching for equity studies in long-term care is an almost fruitless task. 
Exceptions are Evandrou, Falkingham, Le Grand and Winter (1992) or 
Bebbington and Davies (1983). However, most of the few existing studies 
address very specific interpretations of equity, other studies are locally 
restricted, or include only one type of service provision within the complex 
arena of long-term care. Although the concept of equity or equality is introduced 
in a number of studies, it is rarely based on an explicit specification of what is 
meant by equity or an equitable allocation. If there is such a specification, the 
choice of a specific interpretation often seems to be based on a mixture of what 
is supposed to be a widely accepted interpretation and what is going to be 
testable, given the data available. Taking a broader perspective at equity studies 




























































































social policy issues in the light of theories of social justice and those studies 
testing specific interpretations of equity. The wide range of interpretations of 
equity used in practice is mostly ignored. Hence, this paper attempts to analyse 
how different European countries approach the objective of equity by looking at 
actual allocation policies and the operationalisation of equity in long-term care 
systems.
Equity is at the core of welfare state objectives and can be found in all the 
approaches to categorise these objectives. Following Barr (1993) at least four 
sets of equity objectives can be identified:
- Minimum standard: reduction / prevention of absolute poverty / 
disadvantages
- Supporting living standards: prevention of large drops in the living standard
- Reducing inequality: reduction / prevention of relative poverty / 
disadvantages
- Social integration: reduction / prevention of social exclusion
Equity objectives in the welfare state can be achieved by a wide range of 
methods. In order to systemise and analyse these methods in long-term care the 
paper follows the three main characteristics according to which interpretations 
of equity may differ and according to which choices have to be made: WHAT is 
to be shared, among WHOM, and HOW, that is according to which principle. 
(For a more detailed analysis of this approach see Osterle 1999) In many equity 
studies there is not much effort on explicitly discussing any of these questions. 
Exceptions with an investigation of at least some of these characteristics can be 
found in Lee (1995); Sen (1992); Elster (1992); Le Grand (1991, 1982).
As summarised in table 2, the potential resources to be shared in long­
term care are final outcomes (well-being), use, access and choice. The social 
policy means to achieve an equitable distribution in these resources are 
regulation, in kind resources or cash payments, which are allocated to 
individuals, families, institutions or local areas according to principles such as 
need, time-related variables, status variables, economic variables or implicit 
principles.
Figure 1: Interpretations of equity in the provision of long-term care
WHAT outcome use access choice by means o f payments services regulation
HOW




























































































LONG-TERM CARE IN AUSTRIA, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: BASIC FACTS
The countries chosen for the empirical analysis of equity interpretations in long­
term care policies are Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
On the hand these countries share major demographic, social and economic 
challenges. On the other hand they represent quite distinct welfare state 
approaches (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 1993. or with respect to the 
division of care responsibilities Millar and Warman 1996).
A brief overview to the long-term care systems in Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom will be given in this section in order to 
highlight the institutional and the policy mix in the respective countries. The 
following basic terms will be used: residential care (covering care in nursing 
homes and residential homes), domiciliary care covering home nursing (related 
to health aspects) and home help (related to personal and domestic care), 
payments for care to care receivers and payments for care to informal care 
givers.
Table 2: Some demographic and long-term care data
A I NL UK
Population by age group, 65+. total. 1995 (in 1000) 









65-79 as proportion of total population, 1996 (%) 11.4 12.7 10.2 11.7
80+ as proportion of total population, 1996 (%) 3.8 4.1 3.1 4.0
Forecast: Population by age group, 2010
65-79 as proportion of total population (%) 12.8 14.7 11.2 11.7
80+ as proportion of total population (%) 4.7 5.8 3.8 4.3
Forecast: Population by age group, 2020
65-79 as proportion of total population (%) 14.6 16.1 14.7 14.2
80+ as proportion of total population (%) 5.2 7.1 4.2 4.7
Residential care 1996 (IT 1992)
residents as % of those 65+ (Italy 75+) 4 3.5 9 5 *
Domiciliary care 1996
home help recipients as % of those 65+ - - 10 6 *
* England




























































































Basic demographic and long-term care related information on the four countries 
is presented in table 2. Missing data in this table regarding residential and 
domiciliary care is just one small indicator for the constraints in the empirical 
analysis of long-term care issues. Any comparative analysis in long-term care 
faces considerable problems and restrictions arising from definitions and 
concepts varying between and even within countries as well as from data 
availability and comparability. (Sipila 1997; Edvartsen 1996)
Long-term care: The case of Austria 1
Long-term care in Austria has always been strongly based on family networks. 
Until 1993 the public support system in Austria was characterised by a 
decentralised structure of payments and institutional services, with provinces 
and communities being responsible for most of the long-term care matters. This 
resulted in considerable regional imbalances regarding residential and 
domiciliary care. In a number of provinces there were almost no social services 
available. In 1993 a new payment for care programme initiated considerable 
changes in the system of care. The major policy objectives in Austria are the 
development of social services in the community, the support of informal care, 
the assurance of high quality in care and cost containment.
Residential care
A relatively high amount of public money has always been spent for care in 
residential care settings as well as in hospitals, offering care not only for 
severely disabled people but also for people who do not have access to 
alternative care settings due to supply shortage. In 1997 there were 29,400 
nursing home beds, and 35,500 beds in residential homes. More than half of 
these care settings are run by provincial or local public bodies, almost one third 
by nonprofit organisations and the remaining by private forprofit institutions, 
which tend to be much smaller regarding the number of beds per unit. A lack of 
social services in the community as well as waiting lists in residential care 
settings resulted in a number of frail elderly people who are cared for in acute 
hospitals without need for acute care. The recent introduction of payments for 
care (see below) has considerably reduced waiting lists in residential care 
settings. At the same time, the proportion of more severely disabled people 
living in these homes has increased. Financing residential care settings is based 
on fees per day differentiating according to care needs. First of all, clients have 
to make out-of-pocket payments. Pensions as well as payments for care are 
directly transferred to these institutions (up to some pocket money). Additional 
funding is coming from subsidies by provinces or communities. However, 
according to social assistance regulation in the provinces these payments may be 





























































































Social services in the community still do not exist or are far from covering the 
demand for such services in many provinces. In this respect the Austrian 
payment for care programme did not yet fundamentally change the existing 
system. According to a ‘long-term care treaty’ between the central government 
and the nine provinces the latter are obliged to develop a comprehensive 
community care system covering residential, semi-residential and domiciliary 
services until 2010. Part of these development plans are quality standards. The 
provision of home nursing as well as home help services differs considerably 
between provinces in terms of the level of provision as well as the organisation. 
Nonprofit organisations are most important as providers of such services. Public 
bodies as well as forprofit organisations play a minor role in the actual 
provision. With the introduction of payments for care competition has increased 
in some provinces, even if in many areas specific organisations still work in an 
almost monopolistic position. Regarding the coordination between various 
service providers, there is no nationwide concept, however a number of models 
evolved ail over the country.
Regarding eligibility and access to these services there is no systematic 
approach. However, most provinces use standardised forms for assessing the 
needs of the clients. In the case of home nursing by qualified nurses a referral 
from a physician is necessary in order to be reimbursed by the social health 
insurance fund. This reimbursement is based on rather strict criteria covering 
only medical expenses such as for administering injections or dressing wounds. 
Otherwise home nursing as well as home help are funded by a combination of 
payments by provinces and municipalities (as a general subsidy or related to the 
number of clients) as well as clients co-payments. Co-payments became more 
widespread since payment for care programmes have been introduced. In 
general, co-payments are means-tested and increasingly related to the amount of 
the cash benefit.
Payments for care (to care-receivers)
In 1993 a payment for care programme (‘Pflegegeld’) was introduced for 
dependent people with at least 50 hours of care needs per month. Care needs are 
the only eligibility criterion. The payments which are directed to care receivers 
range from ATS 2,000 (EURO 145) per month in level one, to ATS 21,074 
(EURO 1,532) per month in level seven. Level 1 is equivalent to care needs 
between 50 and 75 hours per month, level 7 is equivalent to care needs of more 
than 180 hours per month in combination with complete immobility. The 
evaluation of care needs is based on a medical certificate based on a 
standardised assessment procedure covering medical as well as household and 
personal needs. In dependency level 1 to 3 only the quantitative amount of care 




























































































qualitative aspects. In general, the assessment is undertaken by medical staff of 
the authorities administering the payment for care programme. With the latest 
reform of the payment for care programme, care documentation has to be taken 
into account and informal care-givers have to be consulted in the assessment 
procedure.
Payments for care are not means-tested and paid directly to care receivers. 
Beneficiaries are free how to use the money. Only in case of ‘improper use’ 
benefits in kind can be offered as a substitute. In case of residential care the 
allowance is directly transferred -  down to some pocket money -  to the body in 
charge of the residential home. In 1997, attendance allowances were paid to 
about 310.000 disabled and frail elderly people, representing 3.9% of the 
Austrian population. About half of them are over the age of 80, 85% over the 
age of 60.
Payments for care (to informal care-givers)
There are no direct payments of care to care-givers. However, to some extent 
payments made to care-receivers are transferred to informal care-givers. In 
general these payments cannot be seen as any form of income or compensation 
as they have to be used to cover extra expenses for care and in general do not 
even completely cover these extra expenses. Since 1998 there is a possibility for 
coverage in the social pension insurance system at a lower rate for informal 
care-givers who have been in employment at any time before. In addition, a one 
week leave for care is offered to anyone caring for a close relative. In the case of 
caring for children under the age of 12 there is another week of leave for care.
Informal care
90% of those receiving payments for care are cared for at home. Regarding the 
status quo of home nursing and home help services, this makes close family 
members to main care-givers. In about 5% to 10% of all care arrangements 
social services have to be seen as the main care-giver. 80% of the main informal 
care-givers are women, in particular daughters, daughters in law and partners. 
More than one third of the care-givers are over the age of 60. 37% of those 
under the age of 60 are doing their care work alongside another formal job. In 
Austria there is a legal care obligation -  with variations between the nine 
provinces -  for close family member (spouses, children, parents), which 





























































































Long-term care: The case of Italy 2
Long-term care is strongly based on family and other informal care 
arrangements. The long-term care system is characterised by decentralised 
responsibilities and comparatively low numbers of people cared for by formal 
services. However, because of enormous differences between regions and 
communities this does not reflect the situation of the whole country. There are 
innovative forms of provision and in a number of cities formal service levels are 
quite high. A programme from 1992 (‘Tutela della Salute degli Anziani’) issues 
norms and guidelines for the development of long-term care. Although these are 
not legally binding for provinces and local administration, it can be seen as a 
national approach for a more systematic development of long-term care services. 
One of the important principles to be found in this document is the integration of 
health and social services.
Residential care
The number of people in residential care settings is considerably lower than in 
most other European countries. The distinction between the different types of 
residential care settings are becoming less important. The above mentioned 
document proposed to bring them in line with the so-called ‘Residenza Sanitaria 
Assistenziale’. In 1991 186,000 people were cared for in these homes, among 
whom slightly less then 50% are categorised as ‘not self-sufficient’, and the 
others as ‘self-sufficient’. The term ‘self sufficiency’ is used if primary 
functions of daily living such as eating or walking are still available, but 
autonomous living is limited by other physical or mental restrictions or the 
unavailability of informal support. Regarding the institutional mix there is a 
rather strong private sector. About 43% of beds are offered in the public sector, 
24% in institutions closely related to the public sector, and 33% of beds in the 
private sector. Regarding funding of these homes there is a division between the 
health and the assistance aspect. Whereas health related care is financed by the 
regions, the assistance part has to be paid by the clients. If the client does not 
have sufficient financial means and close relatives (children and other first-line 
relatives) are not capable to financially contribute, the local administration will 
finance the rest from social assistance funds.
Domiciliary care
The responsibility for social services is on the regional and local level. The 
central government is only involved in funding projects in their experimental 
phase. There is no clear cut division of responsibilities between the health sector 
organising domiciliary care within the local health authorities (‘Unita Sanitaria 
Locale’) and the social service sector organising domiciliary care within the 
local authorities. Enormous differences occur not only regarding the extent and 




























































































In the 1992 programme the concept of integrated home care (‘Assistenza 
Domiciliare Integrata’) was put forward, emphasising the integration of health 
related care and social services within the local health authorities. It requires 
collaboration between medical and nursing home care teams from the health 
sector and home help teams form the local authorities. This of course conflicted 
with already existing approaches organising home nursing and home help in the 
social service sector in the north of the country. A second approach which 
became important for the elderly, and in particular for terminally ill people, is 
the so-called home hospitalisation aimed at supporting people after 
hospitalisation and reducing length of stay in hospitals.
The assessment procedure does not require a formal referral and is usually 
undertaken by a geriatric evaluation committee (integrated home care), by a 
team from the hospital (hospitalisation at home) or social workers for home help 
services. As projects in their experimental phase, integrated home care as well as 
home hospitalisation were partly funded by national subsidies. Apart from this, 
domiciliary care is financed from global budgets of the communities (for social 
services) or from regions and local health authorities (for health related care). 
Budgets for health related expenditure are based on insurance contributions, 
general taxation as well as co-payments. Co-payment arrangements in the home 
help sector differ widely. Overall, it is estimated that 50% is paid by the clients 
themselves.
Payments for care (to care-receivers)
There are two payment for care programmes: the ‘Indennità di
Accompagnamento’ (companion payment) and the ‘Assegno di 
Accompagnamento’ (companion cheque). The companion payment is a financial 
support for adult people with care needs, whereas the companion cheque is for 
disabled people under the age of 18. Potential beneficiaries have to apply to the 
local or provincial health units. Although the basic idea of the Indennità di 
Accompagnamento was to support disabled people in the working age, it turned 
out to become a major form of support for frail elderly people. There are 
national definitions of the degree of disability and care needs. The payments are 
directed at the disabled or frail elderly person, who is free to use the money 
either to purchase formal services or to transfer money to informal care-givers.
The maximum level of payments is 1TL 192,000 (EURO 99) per week. 
The level of the payment is set by the central government, but the regions and 
provinces are allowed to pay more. There is no means-testing. In 1990 the 





























































































Payments for care (to informal care-givers)
There are no direct payments to care-givers. But care-receivers are expected to 
use the cash benefit just described to either buy formal services or to pass it to 
informal care-givers. Similar to Austria the payment for care programme seems 
to be a national response to the pressing challenge of an increasing number of 
people in need of care without sufficient support from informal networks on the 
one hand and a lack of social services on the other hand.
Informal care
Due to the fact that the level of residential care as well as formal domiciliary 
care is rather low in Italy, because care for adult family members is legally 
defined as family obligation and the traditional model of extended family 
relations being still important in the south of the country, informal care plays the 
central role in long-term care in Italy. Because of a lack of services in many 
parts of the country there is no other choice than informal care-giving.
Long-term care: The case of The Netherlands3
Besides a two-tier health insurance system (combining social insurance and 
private insurance) there is one social health insurance scheme for the entire 
population, the General Act on Exceptional Medical Expenses (AWBZ), which 
in particular covers long-term care needs. This system was introduced in 1968. 
Whereas nursing homes were integrated from the beginning, homes for the 
elderly were integrated in the AWBZ system only in 1997 (with a transition 
period until 2001). Compared to the other compartment of the health insurance 
system, the influence of central public bodies on AWBZ is rather strong. In 
1996 payments for care (personal budgets) as an option to in kind services were 
introduced, however on a rather small scale. Cost-containment became an issue 
in the long-term care system earlier than in most other European countries. In 
addition, individual responsibility and choice, an increased integration and 
flexibility of the system as well as the promotion of forprofit initiatives are 
major policy concerns.
Residential care
The provision of residential care in the Netherlands is characterised by a 
decreasing number of people living in homes for the elderly and an increasing 
number of residents in nursing homes. Related to the number of those aged 65 
and over, the proportion decreased for homes for the elderly and remained 
constant for nursing homes. The reason for this is a strict cost containment 
policy, including for example a 7% rule (limiting the number of beds to 7% of 
the elderly population in the region), or the introduction of user fees in nursing 
homes. In general, differences between the two types of residences diminish, 




























































































residential care settings are run by nonprofit organisations, to a very small extent 
by public bodies and an almost negligible extent by forprofit organisations. 
Financing residential care is mainly based on AWBZ funds. This is particularly 
true for nursing homes, although user fees related to income were introduced. 
Homes for the elderly are in a transition period. Up to now the residents have to 
pay fees out of their income combining a fixed and a means-tested fee. In 
addition, private savings have to be used, but there is no family obligation to do 
so. The difference is paid by local authorities out of social assistance funds. For 
the future financing regulations in residential care are being harmonised under 
AWBZ.
Domiciliary care
Social services caring for the clients in their own home (home nursing and home 
help services) are organised within regional organisations, which became more 
integrated home care organisations recently. Most of the services are run by 
nonprofit organisations in an almost monopolistic position on a regional level. 
The importance of private forprofit home care organisations is small, although 
recently they were explicitly supported by reserving part of the budget for such 
organisations. Competition therefore might become more important, also 
because there are waiting lists in the home help sector and people increasingly 
have care allowances at their disposal (see below).
Access to the services is universal with no formal referral required. The 
assessment of care needs is done by special assessment teams covering home 
nursing, home help as well as care in residential settings. Although there is 
universal access there is no individual right to receive home help services 
(which exists for home nursing). Therefore, strict budget control by the 
government led to waiting lists in the home help section. In 1996, 10% of those 
65 of age or older received some sort of home help. Home nursing as well as 
home help services are mainly paid out of the AWBZ budgets transferring 
money to the Home Care Organisations who in turn pay the providers. To a 
smaller extent means-tested co-payments and membership fees have to be made.
Payments for care (to care-receivers)
After an experimental phase personal budgets were introduced in 1995 as an 
alternative to in-kind services for those people to be expected in need of care for 
an extended period of more than 3 months. There is no formal referral required 
and the assessment is the same as with in kind benefits. However, whether a 
personal budget will be at disposal depends on the regional home care budget 
reserved for personal budgets. This amount is rather low compared to the whole 




























































































Personal budgets are funded by AWBZ transferred to the local Home Care 
Organisations. The maximum amount a client can get is based on the assessment 
of hours of care needs and the tariffs for the different kinds of services. From 
this amount a means-tested co-payment is deducted. In 1995. the personal 
budget was NLG 1,500 (EURO 681) per month on average. Recipients are 
allowed to use freely only a small part of this amount. Personal budgets are first 
of all used to buy services from forprofit and nonprofit providers and the so- 
called alpha-helpers employed by care receivers, to a small extent for informal 
providers.
Payments for care (to informal care-givers)
There are no payments of care to care-givers and the amount of money from 
personal budgets that is used in the informal sector is rather small. Regarding the 
opportunity of leave for care there is no statutory scheme. But arrangements 
regarding leave for care for a sick relative or the so-called emergency leave can 
be found in a number of agreements between social partners. Another 
opportunity is offered by the so-called career leave ( 2 - 6  months), which might 
be used for care as well. However, the level of benefits -  which are paid out of 
the unemployment fund -  is below the assistance level.
Informal care
Informal care still plays an important role in domestic care and to some extent in 
personal care, although the extent to which care is offered in the formal sector is 
considerably higher than in the other three countries. In the Netherlands there is 
no legal obligation to care for a close relative. With the introduction of co­
payments, limitations in the access to residential care and the existence of 
waiting lists in home help services, private forprofit solutions as well as 
informal solutions might play an increasing role in the future.
Long-term care: The case of the United Kingdom4
Long-term care in the United Kingdom is strictly divided from health care with 
strong local responsibilities. According to the NHS and Community Care Act 
1990 the main responsibility for long-term care is with the local authorities. The 
long-term care system is characterised by a mix of residential and domiciliary 
care, with independent providers becoming more and more important, and a 
wide range of different payment for care programmes. The major policy 
concerns are the finance of care, the support of care in the community, a shift 
from public to private (nonprofit and forprofit) provision, an integration of 





























































































Residential care in the United Kingdom is run by public as well as private 
organisations. Since the 1980s the role of public providers declined, whereas the 
role of forprofit providers increased and nonprofit providers held their position. 
This contracting-out of residential care was supported by economic incentives 
and the requirement to spend a certain amount of budgets in the independent 
sector. Until the beginning of the 1990s there was a considerable increase in the 
number of people living in residential care settings. Since then numbers slightly 
fell. The assessment for access to residential care is combined with the general 
assessement of care needs by multi-disciplinary assessment teams, which has 
also contributed to the decrease in the number of residents in institutionalised 
care.
The regulation of fees has been changed in 1993. Those under the new 
system receive Income Support if their savings are under a certain level plus a 
specific residential allowance for housing costs. Fees not covered by income and 
savings as well as Income Support or other social security benefits will then be 
covered by local authorities. In this case clients are not free to choose the home, 
except relatives are topping up the fee for a more expensive home. There is no 
legal obligation for relatives to pay. On average, one third of costs is covered by 
clients payments.
Domiciliary care
Home nursing is part of the National Health Service and accordingly organised. 
Home help services are organised by local authorities (acting as purchasers and 
providers), voluntary organisations as well as private forprofit organisations. 
Following the objective of splitting the role of purchasing and provision the role 
of private forprofit as well as nonprofit organisations became more important, 
but local authorities are still the main providers of domiciliary care services.
The assessment is increasingly based on standardised assessment forms 
and undertaken by a social worker of the local authorities, a home care team, or 
a care manager. In the decision over the care arrangement the possibility to stay 
in the own home as well as the wishes of clients and carers have to be 
considered. The availability of sufficient financial means can be taken into 
account, denying public services for the more wealthy clients. In 1996, almost 
6% of those 65 years of age and 17% of those 85 years of age and older received 
home help. Whereas there was a considerable decrease in the number of people 
receiving home help in the 1990s, the number of hours per client increased. This 
development shows a concentration on personal care (and less on domestic care) 




























































































Nursing care is fully covered by central government money. Home help is 
financed out of local funds (based on grants from the central government and 
local taxes). Whether services are paid out of these funds depends on needs 
assessment and means-testing, which varies considerably between local areas. 
Regarding co-payment regulations there is a shift towards such regulations and 
towards means-tested fees instead of flat rate payments.
Payments for care (to care-receivers)
The payment for care system in the United Kingdom is characterised by a 
variety of such programmes, differing in objectives and target groups. The 
Attendance Allowance is a, tax-free and not means-tested social security benefit 
for people who are 65 and over in need of personal care. The intention of the 
allowance is to cover extra expenses related to these needs. Claimants must have 
been in need of help for at least six months. For the terminally ill there are 
special regulations. The Attendance Allowance is either UK£ 33,10 (EURO 47) 
per week or UK£ 49.50 (EURO 71) per week for people needing help by day 
and by night. In 1997 14,5% of those over the age of 65 years received this 
benefit. The Disability Living Allowance was introduced in 1992 for people 
under the age of 65 (replacing the former attendance allowance for this age 
group). Claimants must have needed personal care for three months and must be 
expected to need such care for at least six more months. The Disability Living 
Allowance, which is not means-tested, consists of two components: The care 
component which is between UK£ 13.15 and UK£ 49.50 (EURO 19 -  71) per 
week and the mobility component which is between UK£ 13.50 and UK£ 34.60 
(EURO 19-49) per week. In 1997 there were 1.768,000 recipients.
Benefits from the Independent Living Fund 1993 are restricted to people 
in the age between 16 and 65 living alone or with another person unable to 
provide care. Allowances are based on an assessment of care needs, but very 
much restricted in a number of additional respects. For example, claimants may 
only have a very small amount of private savings and an income that is too small 
to cover care needs not covered by other benefits. The benefit has to be used to 
employ one or more people (not close relatives living in the same household) for 
support in personal or domestic care. The number of beneficiaries is rather 
small, but they tend to have very high care needs. On average beneficiaries 
receive UK£ 185 (EURO 264) per week. As part of the Income Support, 
Residential Allowance can be claimed, which however is only available to those 
living in private homes. The Severe Disability Allowance is made to working 
age people who have not been able to work for at least 28 weeks because of an 
illness or disability, but do not have access to sickness or invalidity benefits. The 
assessment is made by a general practitioner. The benefit is UK£ 36.95 (EURO 
53) per week plus an extra benefit between UK£ 4.05 and UK£ 12.90 (EURO 6 




























































































living in the same household. The Severe Disability Premium is a means-tested 
benefit for people with a high level of care needs living alone or with a person 
that does not receive the Invalid Care Allowance (see below).
Direct Payments were introduced in 1997 offering local authorities the 
opportunity to make direct payments to people in need of care instead of in kind 
services. The programme is directed at those between 18 and 65. and at those 
over 65 if they entered the programme under this age. Whether such a 
programme is established and to what extent such payments are made is 
regulated on the local level.
Payments for care (to informal care-givers)
The Invalid Care Allowance is paid to informal care-givers in the working age 
(16 -  65 years), but not to those in full-time education. The person cared for 
must receive an Attendance Allowance or a Disability Living Allowance at a 
middle or higher rate. Caring has to exceed 35 hours per week. The idea of the 
programme is to replace lost earnings. The Invalid Care Allowance is not 
means-tested. Apart from a basic rate of UK£ 37.35 (EURO 53) per week in 
1997, there are extra payments if there are other dependent persons in the same 
household. The Carer Premium is a means-tested allowance for informal carers 
in receipt of Income Support. In 1997 this was UK£ 13.35 (EURO 19) per week. 
With the Home Responsibilities Protection the right to Basic Retirement Pension 
is protected if carers are engaged in caring for at least 35 hours a week for a 
person receiving benefits because of sickness or disability.
Informal care
The fiscal value of informal care was recently estimated to be at least as 5 times 
as high as total public spending. There is no family obligation in the UK to care 
for an older relative. However, recent developments in residential and 
domiciliary care regulations allow local authorities to consider the availability of 
informal care in the assessment of care needs and the decision over the care 
arrangement. This tends to increase family responsibilities either for informal 
care-giving or for the arrangement of formal private solutions. On the other 
hand, the role of informal carers is recognised more than in other countries 
through the 1996 Carers Act and the Carers National Association, which is 




























































































‘EQUITIES’ IN THE PROVISION OF LONG-TERM CARE
All the countries covered by this study are characterised by a division of 
responsibilities between public bodies on the various levels. Compared with 
other social policy fields the role of regional and local levels in the provision 
and regulation of provision is rather strong. Whereas central public bodies are in 
charge of cash benefits, regulations regarding financing long-term care and basic 
regulations regarding the provision of care, regional and local public bodies are 
in charge of the provision and/or regulation of residential care settings and social 
services. The role of informal care-giving has for long been almost ignored in all 
the countries but is nevertheless the main source of care-giving. Only in recent 
years there is increasing recognition of informal long-term care which is -  to 
some extent -  also reflected in policy initiatives, such as the recognition of 
informal care-giving in social insurance and social benefit schemes, the 
introduction of payment for care programmes or the establishment of carers 
associations. The following discussion attempts to analyse the equity approaches 
in long-term care policies focusing on the provision of care and the implications 
on care-receivers.
What is to be shared?
The main resources public policies might be aimed at are the final outcome, the 
use of specific services in the formal or informal sector, access to care, as well 
as choice between various care arrangements.
Regarding the use of specific services quite clear distinctions can be 
figured out in the four countries. Whereas in Italy and Austria there is a legal 
obligation for family members for care between adults, this does not exist in the 
UK and in the Netherlands. (Millar and Warman 1996) In Austria this obligation 
covers children, in Italy other first-line relatives too. In both countries not the 
actual provision of care is mentioned, but the ‘obligation of maintenance’. 
Financial sources from relatives may be used to recover public expenditure for 
publicly provided services. However, there is considerable room for 
discretionary decision in both countries. Although in the UK there is no explicit 
legal obligation of family members in long-term care, there is an increasing 
recognition of the informal care potential in the assessment of care needs and in 
the decision over the care arrangement. With regard to the use of residential 
versus domiciliary care settings there is a strong trend towards domiciliary care 
in all the countries. Historically, home nursing and home help became more 
widespread in the Netherlands and in the UK before this was the case in Austria 
and in Italy. In Austria -  apart from some of the provinces -  residential care has 
been seen as the major public response to the long-term care issue until recently. 




























































































domiciliary care sector, although there are considerable differences within the 
country.
Payment for care programmes are a trend to be observed in long-term care 
policies in a number of European countries. The impact on the care arrangement 
depends on the actual design of such programmes as well as the overall long­
term care system. Whereas payment for care programmes without restrictions in 
the use of the money (as in Austria, in Italy, and partly in the UK) emphasise 
‘choice’, other payment for care programmes restrict ‘choice’ to buy services in 
the formal sector or just a segment of the formal sector (as it is the case in the 
Netherlands). Herewith, payment for care programmes reflect different public 
objectives, either directed at the use of specific services (freedom of choice is 
restricted to providers within this service sector), or directed at offering choice 
between different kinds of services (including the formal and the informal 
sphere). However, whether such choice really exists in practice also depends on 
the development of services in the formal sector as well as the extent of such 
care money. In all the countries, payments for care can only be seen as a 
financial contribution to cover long-term care expenditure. This is even true 
when benefits are relatively high, as in Austria where these benefits are 
explicitly defined as a contribution to cover extra expenses of care. In the 
Netherlands cash benefits for care play a minor role. Here, choice is based on a 
broader set of in kind services. Among the countries studied here, take-up rates 
in the residential and the domiciliary care sector are highest in the Netherlands.
Access describes the opportunity to use, but not the actual use of services. 
Although the levels of provision in Italy and in Austria are considerably lower 
than in the Netherlands and in the UK, there are no significant differences in 
waiting lists in these countries. However, this cannot be interpreted as equality 
in the opportunity to use such services. A number of studies have shown that 
demand in long-term care is greatly determined by the supply level in specific 
sectors, (e.g. Kemper 1992) In fact, access to domiciliary care still does not even 
exist in parts of Italy as well as parts of Austria. Payments for care can be seen 
as an intermediate means to enable access to the actual provision of care. 
Increased purchasing power in the hands of the clients (or informal carers) will 
tend to create more demand for services from outside the narrow informal care 
network. However, as payments are usually only a contribution to the costs of 
care, they first of all tend to increase demand for services either in the wider 
informal sector, in a low paid formal sector or in a subsidised formal sector.
Outcome, the final objective in long-term care, is rather difficult to 
approach. Care is about nursing, as well as assistance and support in personal 
and domestic activities. The contribution of long-term care to the final outcome 




























































































variables, such as the response of care arrangements to individual preferences, 
the qualification of care-givers or the opportunity of independent living under 
the constraints of limiting conditions in health. Long-term care policies tend to 
approach the broader issue of the final outcome in at least two ways: quality 
standards and a range of service alternatives. Standardised needs assessment and 
standards for the actual service provision in the formal sector (such as 
professional qualifications, guidelines and care plans, the number of beds in 
residential care settings or the number of qualified home nurses related to the 
elderly population) are seen as major approaches to support the final outcome. 
The fact that this policy concern evolves at the same time as cost containment 
concerns suggests that such measures are aimed at securing certain standards of 
quality under more rigid economic constraints. At the same time they might 
have an equalising effect over institutions and local areas, at least for some basic 
standards. Although on very different levels, in all the countries a broadening of 
service alternatives (e.g. semi-residential settings) can be observed at the same 
time as increasing restrictions regarding access to specific forms of provision.
Among whom?
Following the overall objective of guaranteeing a specific quantity and quality 
of care by specific providers, public policies in the provision of care may be 
directed at individuals as the final target group as well as individuals, local 
areas or institutions as intermediate target groups. Local areas become the focal 
unit if, for example, central government money is transferred to local authorities. 
This might not just be the case, because local public bodies are in charge of 
social services, but also to reduce inequalities in the service supply within a 
country. Specific institutions or specific segments in the institutional mix might 
be preferably subsidised in order to shift expenditure levels between the 
residential and the domiciliary care sector or between the public and the private 
formal sector. Examples are the 7% rule in the Netherlands (subsidising beds in 
residential care settings in the regions is limited to 7 beds per 100 elderly people 
aged 65 and over) or the reservation of public funds for the independent sector 
in the UK. In Austria and Italy this objective is less explicit in long-term care, 
but the same trends can be observed.
The role of family members as carers in the four countries has been 
briefly described above. Apart from rather clear differences in the ‘obligation’ to 
care, an increasing recognition of the role of informal carers can be observed in 
all the countries. Individuals are increasingly approached in their role as 
informal carers. In general, these approaches have to be seen as a cost- 
containment approach and as a means to strengthen the role of informal care­
giving in potential care arrangements. The socio-economic situation of informal 




























































































countries except the Netherlands payment for care programmes are seen as 
direct or indirect financial support (or incentive) for informal care-giving, at 
least as one option how to use the money. Care leave programmes are an 
additional approach to promote informal care-giving, although the importance of 
such short-term leaves is limited in the case of long-term care.
How?
To what extent shares of specific resources are allocated is defined by a wide 
range of principles of allocation. These principles not only determine whether 
someone receives a share of the resource or not, but also the amount of 
resources allocated. The basic principles according to which resources in long­
term care may be shared are need, time-related, status, economic, mixed and 
implicit principles.
Need seems to be the most adequate allocation principle with respect to 
equity considerations in the provision of health and social care. And in fact, 
need is probably the most widespread principle of allocating resources in long­
term care. On the other hand, need is far from being a clear-cut single principle. 
Need principles are based on morbidity or disability measures, the inability to 
carry out certain activities of daily living, the amount of time needed to support 
people or the ability to benefit from the support. In addition, needs measurement 
differs according to those who are involved in the assessment procedure.
Principles of need can be found for all forms of provision in all the 
countries looked at in this study. In the Netherlands needs assessment for all 
different forms of provision -  residential care, domiciliary care, and payments 
for care -  is now undertaken by the same assessment team, which also decides 
over the care arrangement. To some extent this is also true for Italy and the in 
kind sector in the UK. In Austria those responsible for the assessment are 
general practitioners (in dase of payments for care as well as home nursing to be 
financed by social insurance funds), in the case of residential or domiciliary care 
this is a nurse or an assessement team from the respective institution. If someone 
is applying for a place in a residential care setting, some of these institutions are 
increasingly assessing whether domiciliary care would be adequate and possible, 
but there is no such general approach in Austria.
In Italy and to less extent in Austria coverage with residential and 
domiciliary care only exists in part of the country or is rather limited. Apart 
from these restrictions, assessment procedures and herewith the decision 
whether a person receives home care or a place in a residential care setting, 
depends on policies on the regional and local level as well as on the approach by 




























































































based on national definitions of disability or care needs. Although there have 
recently been adaptations and clarifications in the definition of needs in Austria, 
evidence supports the conclusion that a high take-up rate and a high level of 
equal payments according to need is achieved in this country. In Italy 
considerable variations between different areas occur, which cannot be related to 
differences in morbidity and disability.
Although the definition of need is central to designing and analysing 
social policies, there is a significant lack of information on how different 
assessment procedures do influence the actual outcome of policies. Standardised 
needs assessment combined with care plans might reduce room for discretion on 
the micro-level, in particular if this approach is accompanied by an improvement 
of data on long-term care issues. Overall, needs assessment plays an important 
role in the allocation of long-term care resources but we are far from having 
need as the only allocation principle in all the countries.
A second approach to allocate resources are time-related principles, in 
particular waiting-lists. Time related principles are used in long-term care either 
for practicality reasons, as an explicit or implicit concept of rationing or as an 
additional indicator of need. Waiting lists have been and still are an important 
allocating principle in the residential care sector in most of the countries. 
However, trends to support domiciliary care, economic restrictions for the 
further expansion of the residential care sector, and targeting of this sector 
towards the severely disabled have reduced these waiting lists.
Regarding waiting lists in the domiciliary care sector there is evidence for 
waiting lists in the home help sector in the Netherlands, which is one of the 
driving forces for the development of independent providers outside the publicly 
financed scheme. Whereas there are no guarantees for home help in none of the 
countries, there is such a guarantee for specific home nursing activities from the 
health system. But even here, procedures might be designed in a way that leads 
to considerable waiting time. In general, the existence of waiting lists is only a 
mediocre indicator for comparing unmet need across countries or even across 
local areas, as the demand for such services is very much determined by the 
existing supply structure.
Another form of time-related principles can be found in the Attendance 
Allowance scheme in the United Kingdom which requires that those applying 
must have been in need of care for at least six months.
The set of status principles includes a variety of principles such as age, 
family status, residence status or occupational status. In health and social care 




























































































group. Age can be found in many payment for care programmes as an additional 
principle of allocating resources. Whereas the Austrian payment for care 
programme is open for disabled people of all age-groups, the Italian and partly 
the UK payment for care programmes differentiate according to age, but offer 
cash benefits for all age groups. In Italy there is a division between adults and 
those under the age of 18 but the actual allocation principle does not differ 
between these two age-groups. In the UK 65 years of age is the dividing line for 
receiving either Attendance Allowance or Disability Living Allowance, offering 
a different amount of benefits. Direct Payments in the UK are reserved to those 
between 18 and 65 years of age as well as elderly who entered the programme 
before they have reached the age of 65. But differentiation according to age can 
not only be found as an explicit principle. There also seem to exist hidden 
assumptions regarding different objectives in long-term care according to age, as 
for example in the objective of independent living.
It has already been mentioned that in Italy and in Austria, and increasingly 
in the UK, informal care-giving resources are taken into account in the decision 
over the care arrangement. Herewith, family status as well as the question 
whether a person is living on its own or together with other people, is used as a 
principle for allocating long-term care resources.
One of the principles to be found in all the countries is a rather high level 
of decentralisation, allowing considerable local variations in the provision of 
long-term care. Among the four countries the Netherlands are the exception in 
this respect as there are important national standards alongside the organisation 
on the local level. Whereas decentralisation is not questioned in principle and 
even strengthened in some respects, at the same time a number of measures have 
been introduced in recent years to increase national regulation and to develop 
nationwide approaches. Steps in this direction are payment for care programmes, 
the reservation of central public money for specific use, quality standards, or 
guidelines which are not legally binding but do have some influence on the 
development on the local level.
Economic variables in allocating resources in long-term care occur on the 
micro as well as on the macro level. On the micro-level means-testing is either 
used to allocate benefits in kind or in cash just to those whose ability to pay is 
below a certain level or to design co-payments according to the ability to pay. In 
general, the ability to pay is based on the income of the client, but might be 
broadened covering also savings as well as income and savings from close 
relatives. Financing residential care in Austria and Italy as well as in the UK is 
first of all based on financial means of the clients including benefits such as 
payments for care or Income Support in the UK. Total costs not covered 




























































































recovered from close relatives in Austria and Italy, although there is much room 
for discretion in this respect. In the Netherlands residential care is financed out 
of public funds (residential homes are in a transition period) with co-payments 
form residents which are related to income.
As a general rule, domiciliary services are covered by a combination of 
public funds and increasingly means-tested co-payments. Although these co­
payments differ considerably within countries they are lower in Austria and in 
the Netherlands compared to Italy and the United Kingdom. Payments for care 
are not means-tested in Austria and in Italy. This is also true for some benefits in 
the UK (such as for the Attendance Allowance and the Disability Living 
Allowance scheme), but there are means-tested programmes as well (such as the 
Carer Premium). In the personal budget programme in the Netherlands income 
related co-payments are deducted. Overall, payment for care programmes are a 
more or less important contribution to cover long-term care expenses. Covering 
an extended amount of care by external providers remains a privilege for those 
with private financial means to cover additional costs.
Another form of economic principles apply, if different forms of 
providing care result (or are supposed to result) in the same outcome. Here, 
efficiency could be used as an appropriate principle to decide which form of 
provision to promote. Although the outcome of caring for frail elderly people in 
acute hospitals, in residential care settings or in the community will not be 
exactly the same, there is room for allocating resources among these different 
institutions according to the efficiency principle. And indeed, this is one of the 
driving forces for the redesign of long-term care systems in many countries. One 
example for an explicit approach in this direction can be found in the 7% rule in 
the Netherlands restricting the number of beds in the residential care sector. 
Similar explicit incentives are used to shift the actual provision from public 
providers to providers in the independent sector in the UK. Although there is 
always the restriction in the availability of funds, budgets are increasingly used 
as an instrument of guiding allocation. Apart from the examples already 
mentioned (reserving parts of the budget for certain activities), overall budgets 
given to local authorities have a similar effect in that it puts pressure on these 
authorities to search for cost-effective ways for providing long-term care.
Obviously, most of the principles described are not used as single 
principles, but as mixed principles. The concept of need is combined with time- 
related principles, a variety of status principles, economic principles as well as 
implicit principles. In this case allocation of resources is (partly) determined by 




























































































If people in need of care have to make out-of-pocket payments to get 
access to social services, this might to some extent exclude the poorest because 
of lack of purchasing power. This is even true if there is means-testing, as 
means-testing might involve consequences (e.g. stigmatisation) creating an 
incentive not to claim for a benefit. Attitudes towards care giving (such as 
viewing external care as pushing off a moral obligation) may create incentives to 
offer informal care, even if there are formal services available. Such incentives 
seem to highly correlate with the legal obligations to be found in the different 
countries and the amount of services offered in the formal sector.
The informational background of users is another implicit principle, 
which tends to favour those with better access to information. For example, 
take-up ratios for cash benefits are often higher among those supported by social 
services as these also have an important role as providers of information. Other 
implicit principles in the allocation of resources might occur because of 
orientations of individual decision-makers, lobbying or political power. 
Considerable local variations in take-up ratios in the Italian payment for care 
programme seem to result to some extent from such implicit principles. The 
creation and support of lobbying associations, as the Carers Association in the 
UK, are important to increase awareness of the issue and to reduce some of the 
inequalities based on such implicit principles.
Although the legal obligation to care for frail elderly family members still 
very much shapes long-term care in Italy and in Austria, room for discretion is 
also used in these countries to reduce financial burdens in case of residential 
care. On the other hand, in the UK there is no such legal obligation. But, 
because of strict budget control, hidden assumptions about family obligation 
seem to become more important in the assessment of care needs increasing 
expectations regarding the role of the family.
CONCLUSIONS
The results may be summarised as follows: Regarding the division between 
family and public responsibilities and the level of services provided there is a 
clear hierarchy ranging from the Netherlands with a high level of public 
responsibility and a high level of services regarding the number of people 
covered as well as the range of services, to Italy with a low level of public 
responsibility and a low level of service supply from the welfare state. Austria 
and the United Kingdom are situated between the other two countries, with 
Austria closer to Italy. Whereas the Netherlands emphasise in kind provision, 
payment for care programmes are an additional approach in the other countries, 




























































































alternatives between residential care, semi-residential care and domiciliary care 
but restricted on the other hand by stricter standardised needs assessment and 
co-payments becoming more widespread.
Need is in the centre of the allocation principles, but all the countries are 
far from allocating resources just according to an interpretation of need that is 
related to the health condition and resulting requirements for care. In all the 
countries there is a tendency towards stricter needs assessment. The public 
response to long-term care needs is restricting residential care more and more to 
those with severe disabilities, and domiciliary care to home nursing and personal 
care. As responsibilities in long-term care within the public sector are very much 
with regional and local public bodies, the allocation of resources is characterised 
by considerable local variations. The exception are the Netherlands where 
national regulation is strongest. Overall, means-testing and income-related co­
payments are becoming more important in the in kind service sector in all the 
countries. These measures are aimed at cost-containment, providing more cost- 
effective care, and sharing financial responsibilities. In the residential care 
sector, means-testing in Austria and in Italy includes not just the client but close 
family members too. On the other hand, in these two countries the existing 
payment for care programmes are not means-tested.
It remains the question, to what extent these approaches to allocate 
services and benefits through long-term care policies fit with basic equity 
objectives of the welfare state. The minimum standard objective is strongest in 
Austria and in Italy. Although payments for care offer some relief in these 
countries, in the case of long-lasting and severe disabilities they do not prevent 
people to spend all their income and savings -  to some extent including income 
and savings from close relatives -  for long-term care, if they have to be cared for 
in residential care settings. However, this just reflects the long-term care issue. 
Taking the overall economic situation in old age into account, might result in a 
different picture regarding the situation of frail elderly people in Austria, Italy 
and the UK.
The objective of supporting living standards, that is the prevention of 
drops in the living standard, is achieved in all the countries to the extent to 
which the public sector provides payments or services free of charge through 
direct provision, purchasing provision, or insurance systems. However, 
compared to health care, being in need of long-term care means a considerably 
higher risk of dropping in the standard of living. Support in this respect is 
highest in the Netherlands. Residential care giving results in a considerable drop 
in the living-standard in the other three countries, including close family 
members in Italy and Austria. Such considerable drops are less likely in the case 




























































































case of severe and long-lasting care needs. Informal care-giving is a major form 
of providing care in all the countries, in particular in Italy and in Austria as well 
as in the United Kingdom. Here, the risk of dropping in living standard is shifted 
within family relationships. In practice, mostly women are acting as main 
informal care-givers and herewith being in a most precarious position regarding 
labour market opportunities and social security.
The redistributive objective cannot be assessed without taking the finance 
of long-term care into account. This has not been the objective of this paper. As 
with regard to provision, redistributive implications are limited, although means­
testing and income-related co-payments do have such an effect. Overall, the 
redistributive implications from the provision side are restricted to the 
implications of what is guaranteed as a minimum level of support or as support 
of a specific level of living standard, herewith reducing horizontal inequalities.
The effects of the respective long-term care systems on the issue of social 
integration can not be judged without taking the social and cultural background 
in these countries into account. Apart from the resource situation (covered by 
the three objectives just mentioned) choice sets are an important determinant. 
Here, some similarities in qualitative trends (not in the extent) can be observed: 
All the countries looked at spend some efforts on a diversification of long-term 
care systems offering opportunities between the traditional approach of 
residential and domiciliary care as well as measures to integrate the various 
services. Whereas this tends to increase choice, access to specific services is 
reduced by stricter assessment of needs and of the availability of informal care. 
An increase in public awareness of the issue, and similar social and economic 
challenges in all the countries are responsible for similarities in recent 
approaches to redesign the allocation of resources in long-term care. However, 
because basic principles of public vs. private responsibilities have not been 
changed fundamentally in explicit terms, differences will remain quite 





























































































1 Based on Badelt, Holzmann-Jenkins. Matul and Osterle (1997); Badelt and 
Osterle (1998): Kalisch, Aman and Buchele (1998); Millar and Warman (1996); 
Weekers, Pijl (1998).
EURO conversion rate: 1 EURO = 13.7603 ATS
2 Based on Facchini and Scortegagna (1993); Glendinning and McLaughlin 
(1993); Hutten (1996a); 1STAT (1997); Kalisch, Aman and Buchele (1998); 
Millar and Warman (1996); Weekers and Pijl (1998).
EURO conversion rate: 1 EURO = 1,936.27 1TL
3 Based on Kalisch, Aman and Buchele (1998); Kerkstra (1996); Okma (1998); 
Millar and Warman (1996); Pijl (1993); Rostgaard and Fridberg (1998); 
Weekers and Pijl (1998).
EURO conversion rate: 1 EURO = 2.20371 NLG
4 Based on Baldock (1993); Glendinning and McLaughlin (1993); Hutten 
(1996b); Kalisch, Aman and Buchele (1998); Millar and Warman (1996); 
Rostgaard and Fridberg (1998); Weekers and Pijl (1998).
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